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The outbreak of severe acute respiratory syudrome (SARS) was notable 
for its transmission within healthcare facilities, and in particular for infecting 
healthcare workers (HCWs) who provided direct patient care. This paper focuses 
on assessing the risk factors related to HCW s acquiring SARS and the 
effectiveness of infection control measures in protecting HCWs from disease 
transmission while caring for SARS infected patients. Risk factors associated 
with SARS transmission include contact with respiratory secretions, exposure to 
aerosol generating procedures, duration of exposure to SARS patients, duration of 
infection control training, and perceived inadequacy of personal protective 
equipment supply. Protective factors associated with SARS transmission include 
wearing of a mask and hand hygiene. In order to improve hospital preparedness 
for possible future disease outbreaks, efforts in enhancing infection control 
training must be a priority. Standardizing and improving the quality of research 
conducted in the face of a disease outbreak is another area deserving of attention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) emerged as a new 
syndrome due to a novel human pathogen during November 2002 in Guangdong 
Province, China. In February 2003, a physician who had been treating cases of 
pneumonia in this southern province of China traveled to Hong Kong where he 
subsequently became ill. As a result of a one-day hotel stay in Hong Kong, ten 
individuals who stayed in the same hotel became infected with the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus (SARS-Co V) despite having no 
reported direct contact with the doctor. The subsequent travel of these infected 
hotel guests was responsible for the transport of SARS to five other countries and 
marked the beginning of the global outbreak.1 
The World Health Organization (WHO) issued the first global alert 
pertaining to SARSon March 12, 2003.2 This announcement described the 
outbreak of a severe form of atypical pneumonia occurring in Vietnam, Hong 
Kong, and Guangdong Province, China. A notable item of concern was that this 
severe respiratory illness had spread to a high number ofhealthcare workers 
(HCWs) in two of the three locations, and those at highest risk appeared to be 
staff providing direct patient care. Due to the unknown cause of the illness and 
the high incidence among HCWs, the WHO recommended isolation and barrier 
nursing techniques for treating patients with atypical pneumonia. 
The last case ofSARS associated with this outbreak was reported in July 
2003. The Figure in Appendix 1 shows the total number of SARS cases and the 
number of infected HCWs for the top five affected geographical areas. Over the 
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course of the outbreak there were 8,096 cases reported in 26 countries resulting in 
774 deaths. HCWs accounted for 1,706 ofthese reported cases, or roughly 20% 
of the cases worldwide? Moreover, three countries reported greater than 40% of 
all SARS cases involved HCWs. Visitors and other patients also acquired SARS 
while in healthcare facilities. In Toronto, Canada and Singapore, >70% of all 
probable SARS patients were exposed in the healthcare setting.4'5 
Several confirmed cases ofSARS have occurred since the end of the 
outbreak in July, 2003. Separate SARS cases linked to laboratory acquisition 
occurred in Singapore and Taiwan during the fall of2003, however neither case 
resulted in further transmission.6 In December, 2003 the first naturally acquired 
case of SARS since the disease was contained was reported in Guangdong 
Province, China? While authorities quickly quarantined 81 of the patient's 
contacts, three more cases were reported.6 Finally, in late March and mid-April, 
2004 two researchers at the National Institute ofVirology in Beijing, China 
developed SARS. One of these cases was subsequently linked to seven other 
SARS patients, of which three were exposed in the healthcare setting. 8 As neither 
of the two researchers had conducted experiments using live SARS-Co V, lapses 
in biosafety procedures at the Institute were considered the most likely source of 
the infection.9 As of June 1, 2005 additional cases ofSARS have not been 
reported to the WHO since 2004. 
Epidemiology of SARS 
During the outbreak, the primary mode of SARS transmission appeared to 
occur via direct mucous membrane contact with respiratory droplets.10-13 These 
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respiratory droplets were generated when a SARS patient talked, coughed, or 
sneezed. Reports have also suggested alternate modes of SARS transmission 
through contact with fomites14. 17 or opportunistic airborne spread.17-20 Within 
health care settings, notable exceptions to the primary route of exposure occurred 
principally through aerosol generating procedures21 -23 and so called super-
spreaders5 or super-spreading events.24 Examples of aerosol generating 
procedures included nasopharyngeal aspiration, bronchoscopy, endotracheal 
intubation, airway suctioning, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and non-invasive 
positive pressure ventilation. An illustration of an apparent super-spreader was an 
ill hospital laundry attendant in Taiwan who continued working in spite of 
worsening symptoms. Ultimately this one worker was responsible for at least 137 
probable SARS cases, including 45 HCWs.25 
The basic reproduction number (Ro) of an infection gives a measure of 
how well an epidemic spreads in a susceptible population in the absence of 
control measures. 26 R0 is defined as the average number of secondary cases 
generated by one primary case in a susceptible population. Studies of the 
transmission dynamics of SARS have estimated that the Ro is 2.2-3.7.Z6J7 This is 
consistent with a disease spread by direct contact or large respiratory droplets, as 
opposed to aerosol transmission.12 Ro does not need to be zero in order to stop an 
outbreak, but merely reduced and maintained below 1. 
Measurement of viral load in nasopharyngeal aspirates taken from SARS 
patients indicates a significant rise after day 6. Peak virus excretion from the 
respiratory tract occurs at about day 10 or 11 of illness and then declines 
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quickly. 28,29 Viral shedding in stool appears to peak between day 9 to 14 of 
illness and then gradually declines?8•29 Also significant was the finding that viral 
load in stool is much higher than that in nasopharyngeal aspirates.29 These 
findings suggest that patients are most infectious during the second week of 
illness, which is when many of them were hospitalized. In addition, direct or 
indirect contact with stool may serve as a significant source of exposure. 
SARS-Co V has been shown to survive outside of a human host for several 
days. The virus is stable in stool and urine at room temperature for at least 1-2 
days. It was also shown that SARS-Co Vis stable for up to 4 days in stool from 
patients with diarrhea, due to higher pH as compared with normal stool. 30 
Additionally, the virus has been isolated from a dry plastic surface after 6 days31 
and after 4 days on a glass slide.12 As a result, contaminated objects in the 
enviromnent may act as inanimate carriers of SARS-Cov for several days 
potentially leading to cross-transmission via indirect contact. 
Due to a lack of distinct clinical features separating SARS from other 
community-acquired respiratory infections, nosocomial spread within healthcare 
settings was the principal means of disease amplification early in the outbreak.32'33 
Atypical case presentations were also problematic and may have resulted in a 
more relaxed use of personal protective equipment (PPE) by HCW s involved with 
patient care.14 Further complicating the issue of SARS transmission was whether 
or not asymptomatic infections were possible. Several large seroepidemiologic 
studies ofHCWs conducted since the end of the SARS outbreak revealed that 
inapparent infection with SARS was uncommon.34-37 
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In response to this new disease, SARS infection control guidelines were 
developed by numerous health agencies (WH0/8 Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention [CDC],39 Health Canada,40 and others). Control measures 
implemented within healthcare facilities included patient screening and isolation, 
use ofPPE by HCWs, and an emphasis on hand hygiene. Ultimately, the 
employment of infection control measures in healthcare settings, along with 
contact tracing and quarantine in the community, proved effective in bringing 
about an end to the SARS outbreak. 
Much has been learned about SARS during and since the outbreak, but to 
date no systematic review has been published evaluating the risk factors for 
infection ofHCWs or the effectiveness of preventive measures taken in healthcare 
facilities in halting transmission. While it is true that the actions taken during the 
outbreak were effective in interrupting SARS transmission, they were not without 
consequence in terms of direct and indirect costs,41 impairment with patient 
care,42 and psychological impact.43•44 With ongoing concern over the potential for 
emergence of a new human pathogen or another influenza pandemic, efforts in 
assessing the infection control response to SARS in healthcare settings will 
benefit preparedness for any future outbreaks. The remainder of this paper 
focuses on assessing the risk factors related to HCWs acquiring SARS and the 
effectiveness of infection control measures in protecting HCWs from disease 
transmission while caring for SARS infected patients. 
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METHODS 
To identify relevant articles, the MEDLINE database was searched from 
November 2002 through May 2005 by combining the Medical Subject Heading 
severe acute respiratory syndrome with disease transmission, patient-to-
professional or protective devices (as well as masks or gloves or gowns or 
goggles) or infection control or health personnel. Additional search strategies 
involved hand searching bibliographies, and a journal hand search for the last 
twelve months of Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology and Clinical 
Infectious Diseases. 
Case-control and cohort studies conducted in hospital settings that 
examined the risk factors for HCWs acquiring SARS from infected patients, or 
determined protective factors for infection control practices utilized by HCWs 
while caring for SARS patients were reviewed. To avoid the possibility of 
unrecognized community acquired SARS transmission, studies had to include 2:3 
infected HCWs who had cared for at least one confirmed SARS source patient. 
Articles had to report on original studies. Reviews, editorials, commentaries, case 
series reports, non English articles, and articles on dentistry were excluded from 
consideration. 
The titles and abstracts of the articles identified by the literature search 
were reviewed and articles were excluded if they failed to meet the eligibility 
criteria. When it was not possible to determine if the eligibility criteria were met 
based upon the abstract alone, articles were carried forward and the full article 
was reviewed to determine inclusion or exclusion. 
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Articles were then abstracted and the relevant information from each 
article was recorded into evidence tables. Based on the evidence presented within 
the article, an assessment was made as to the internal and external validity. 
Internal validity of the two types of stndies found in this review was based upon a 
determination of the potential for selection bias, information bias, and 
confounding present within the stndy. External validity was evaluated by the 
ability to generalize the findings of the stndy to a population ofhealthcare 
workers caring for patients in a hospital setting, within the limits of the stndy' s 
internal validity. Whenever possible, the clinical importance of a stndy's findings 
is discussed as it relates to protection ofHCWs from SARS transmission. 
RESULTS 
Risk Factors Associated with SARS Transmission 
The risk factors associated with SARS transmission from patients to 
HCWs were evaluated in five hospital based stndies.21 •22•4547 The factors 
examined include time and proximity to a SARS patient, contact with respiratory 
secretions, present during aerosol generating procedures, and infection control 
training. The stndies differed in the nnrnber of SARS patients treated, the 
duration of exposure, and the recognition by HCWs that a patient in fact had 
SARS. The studies are described below and significant findings are summarized 
in Table 1 in Appendix 1. Evidence tables for these stndies are in Appendix 2. 
Proximity and Duration of Exposure to SARS Patients 
Scales and colleagues45 evaluated the risk factors associated with the 
development of 7 SARS cases ( 6 probable, 1 suspectedt8•49 among a cohort of 69 
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HCWs who were exposed to an undiagnosed SARS patient during a 31 hour stay 
in an intensive-care unit (ICU). These 69 HCWs had entered the patient's room 
or had been in the ICU for 2:4 hours during the patient's stay. SARS developed in 
6 of31 HCWs who had entered the patient's room, and all six HCWs reported 
contact with the patient's mucous membranes or respiratory secretions while 
performing a procedure. PPE used among the six HCWs ranged from N-95 mask, 
gown, and gloves, to inconsistent PPE use or no PPE. The odds ratio (OR) for 
acquiring SARS when the HCW spent2:31 minutes in the patient's room was 12.9 
(95% confidence interval [CI], 1.27 to 131). When 2:4 hours were spent in the 
patient's room the OR for acquiring SARS was 24.0 (95% CI, 1.85 to 311). 
SARS developed in 1 of38 HCWs who had not entered the patient's 
room. This nurse was present in the ICU for almost 19 hours during the patient's 
stay. No conclusive evidence of exposure was available for this HCW, and there 
was no recognized exposure to any other persons known to have SARS. This 
case suggests possible airborne transmission or indirect person-to-person 
transmission. 
Limitations of this study include the small sample size and the lack of 
confirmatory serological testing among the 7 HCWs diagnosed with SARS. Also 
problematic was the inadequate reporting of demographic characteristics of the 
cohort. One of the potential strengths ofthis study was the defined period of 
exposure to just one SARS patient in a confined hospital unit. 
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Exposure to Respiratory Secretions 
Teleman and associates 46 investigated the factors that resulted in 44 
laboratory confirmed cases ofSARS in HCWs employed at Singapore's 
designated SARS referral treatment center. This nosocomial outbreak involving 
HCWs was linked to three source cases that were not initially diagnosed as having 
SARS. As a result of delayed recognition of SARS, these three patients were 
treated in general hospital wards and only placed in isolation anywhere from 3-8 
days after admission. Over the course of this hospital based outbreak, there was a 
gradual escalation in PPE requirements. Initially, HCWs only employed N95 
masks when caring for the first recognized SARS case. By the end of the second 
week PPE against contact, droplet, and respiratory transmission were 
implemented in SARS screening and treatment areas. Finally at the beginning of 
week 3, N95 masks were required when treating any patient in the hospital. 
While PPE requirements continued to increase for several more weeks, there was 
no further nosocomial transmission after the beginning of week 3. In multivariate 
analysis of factors associated with transmission ofSARS to HCWs the adjusted 
OR for contact with respiratory secretions was 21.8 (95% CI, 1.7 to 274.8), 
controlling for gender, ethnicity, and use ofN95 mask, gloves, and gown. Risk 
factors such as proximity, patient contact, duration of exposure, and performance 
of aerosol generating procedures were not shown to be significant in univariate 
analysis. 
Controls for this study were selected from a pool of healthy HCWs who 
reported being within close proximity (1 meter) to probable SARS patients during 
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the same time period. The reported demographic characteristics of the case and 
control groups were similar except for a higher proportion of ethnic Chinese than 
non-Chinese among the cases. In a multivariate analysis, after adjusting for PPE, 
handwashing, and contact with respiratory secretions, the ethnicity ofHCWs was 
no longer significant 
Limitations of the study include small sample size, incomplete exposure 
histories, HCWs caring for more than one SARS patient, recall bias during a 
stressful period, and potential differences between actual and reported use ofPPE. 
Variation in stage of infection for each source patient, which could have affected 
viral load and subsequently viral shedding, was also not addressed. 
Present During Aerosol Generating Procedures 
Four studies21 ,22'45.46 included data on HCW exposure to aerosol 
generating procedures during care of SARS patients. One of the four studies 
focused primarily on aerosol generating procedures, while the other three 
included this among other factors analyzed. 
Fowler and colleagues22 reviewed the factors involved in 10 probable 
cases ofSARS that developed among a cohort of 122 HCWs who were exposed 
to 7 SARS patients treated with various modes of ventilator support. All patients 
were treated in negative-pressure isolation rooms, and all HCWs wore gloves, 
gowns, N95 or PCM2000 masks, and haimets. Use of eye or face shields was 
variable. The relative risk (RR) for physicians performing endotracheal 
intubation was 3.82 (95% CI, 0.23 to 62.24), which was not statistically 
significant. In contrast, the RR for nurses who assisted with intubation was 21.38 
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(95% CI, 4.89 to 93.37). The risk of developing SARS for nurses who cared for 
patients with high-airflow, noninvasive positive-pressure ventilation (NPPV) or 
high-frequency oscillatory (HFO) ventilation, as compared with nurses who cared 
for patients treated with conventional ventilation was 2.33 (95% CI, 0.25 to 
21.76) and 0.74 (95% CI, 0.11 to 4.92) respectively; both of which were not 
statistically significant. 
Limitations of this study include the small sample size, especially for 
physicians performing endotracheal intubation, and lack oflaboratory 
confirmation of the source patients. Also, there was very limited demographic 
data available as to the composition of the cohort and there was no mention of 
how exposure data was collected. 
Loeb and associates21 evaluated the risk factors associated with 8 cases (4 
probable and 4 suspected based upon the WHO clinical case definition; all 
laboratory confirmed) ofSARS among 32 HCWs who cared for 3laboratory 
confirmed SARS source patients. Al132 HCWs had entered a SARS patient's 
room at least once. The type and consistency ofPPE use by the 32 HCWs was 
reported as variable. The RR for suctioning before intubation of SARS patients 
was 4.20 (95% CI, 1.58 to 11.14). The RR for assisting with intubation ofSARS 
patients was 4.20 (95% CI, 1.58 to 11.14). The RR for manipulating an oxygen 
mask was 9.0 (95% CI, 1.25 to 64.9). No multivariate analysis was performed. 
Limitations of this study include small sample size and recall bias. A 
potential strength of this study was the verification of the information provided by 
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the nurses through comparison with the clinical notation recorded in the medical 
record of each SARS patient. 
Scales et al45 reported 3 out of 5 HCWs present during intubation of a 
SARS patient developed SARS. Also, the OR for HCWs being present in the 
patient's room for >31 minutes during the administration ofNPPV .was I 05 (95% 
CI, 3 to 3,035). In contrast, Teleman46 reported no statistical differences between 
cases and controls in univariate analysis of assisting with intubation, suctioning of 
body fluids, or administering oxygen. 
Infection Control Training 
Lau and colleagues47 investigated the risk factors associated with 77 
probable and suspected SARS cases involving HCWs from five hospitals in Hong 
Kong between March and May, 2003. Each HCW with SARS was matched with 
two healthy controls who worked in the same job position, on the same ward, and 
in proximity (not defined) to a SARS patient. During this same time period, there 
were 453 confirmed SARS cases treated in the five hospitals. As all HCWs were 
required to wear protective masks (either N95 respirator or surgical mask) during 
this time period, breakthrough transmission was assumed to be responsible for all 
cases ofSARS among these HCWs. Factors reviewed in this study included 
exposure (both within the healthcare setting and socially), PPE, and infection 
control training. 
Unadjusted results suggested that the duration of infection control training 
(<2 hours versus 2:2 hours) was positively associated with understanding of 
infection control practices, and that failure to understand infection control 
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measures resulted in higher risk ofSARS infection, OR 3.14 (95% CI, 1.35 to 
7.73). After controlling for exposure and PPE variables, the adjusted OR for 
SARS infection control training <2 hours or no training was 13.6 (95% CI, 1.24 to 
27.50). 
There were several limitations noted in this study. Job category was the 
only demographic or background data provided on the sample group. Thus it was 
not possible to evaluate the comparability of the case and control groups. Recall 
bias may have also affected the study results, as there was no way to measure 
actual compliance with infection control training attendance or duration. HCWs 
may have had a tendency to over report training and PPE use when responding to 
the questionnaires in order to avoid potential repercussions. Strengths of the 
study include a relatively large sample size and the controlling for exposure 
(healthcare setting versus social) in the multivariate analysis. 
Protective Factors 
The protective factors associated with a lack of SARS transmission from 
patient to HCW were evaluated in five hospital based studies.21 .4547•50 The 
protective effect of masks, gloves, gowns, perception ofPPE supply, and hand 
hygiene were examined. The studies are described below and significant findings 
are summarized in Table 2 in Appendix 1. Evidence tables for these studies are in 
Appendix2. 
Use of Personal Protective Equipment 
Five studies21 .4547•50 reported on the risk factors associated with use of 
PPE by HCW s during direct contact with SARS patients. All five studies 
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evaluated HCW use ofPPE along with other factors that may have affected the 
risk of acquiring SARS from infected patients. 
Seto and associates50 evaluated the protective effect of masks, gloves, 
gowns, and handwashing associated with 13 laboratory confirmed SARS cases 
involving HCWs from five hospitals in Hong Kong occurring over ten days in 
March, 2003. 241 non-infected HCWs who had similar exposure to 11 SARS 
patients were used as controls. Exposure was defined as coming within 3 feet of 
an index patient, while also having no exposure to SARS cases outside of the 
hospital. Use ofPPE was classified as yes, most of the time, and no. For 
analysis, responses for yes and most of the time were grouped together. No HCW 
who reported employing all four precautions became infected, whereas all 
infected HCWs had omitted at least one of the protective measures. In 
multivariate analysis of the four factors measured, only use of a mask was found 
to be significant. The use of a mask (N95, surgical, or paper) had a protective OR 
of 13 (95% CI, 3 to 60), adjusting for the use of gloves, gown and handwashing. 
When use of each type of mask was compared with the use of no mask, only N95 
and surgical masks were shown to significantly reduce the risk of SARS infection. 
There were several limitations noted in the analysis of this study. The 
differences in the demographic characteristics between the case and control 
groups were not presented. Also, the possible differences in HCW-patient 
exposure intensity between the case and control groups were not fully evaluated. 
One HCW infected with SARS was excluded from the case group due to a lack of 
known exposure to one of the 11 index cases, and was thus listed as community 
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acquired. Finally, the authors excluded from consideration a 'large' nosocomial 
outbreak at a sixth Hong Kong hospital that was associated with an aerosol 
generating procedure. Although this omission was in line with their study 
question assessing the effectiveness of droplet precautions for prevention of 
SARS in HCWs, it may have also affected the external validity of the study. 
Teleman and associates46 evaluated the same four transmission 
precautions as Seto eta! in their study ofHCWs in Singapore. The OR for a 
HCW acquiring SARS while wearing an N95 mask was 0.1 (95% CI, 0.02 to 0.9), 
adjusting for use of gloves, gown, and hand hygiene. Of note in this study is the 
fact that lengthy aerosol generating procedures were not performed on any of the 
3 index cases, and that there was no significant difference between cases and 
controls for performing short duration aerosol generating procedures. Use of 
gloves and gowns were not significantly associated with transmission prevention 
during contact with a SARS patient. 
Scales and colleagues45 reported an OR of0.08 (95% CI, 0.01 to 1.11) for 
use of gloves by HCWs when in direct contact with a SARS patient, however this 
result was not statistically significant. No OR was reported for use of gowns or 
masks. 
Loeb and associates21 evaluated the ability of masks, gloves and gowns to 
prevent the transmission ofSARS to HCWs. The RR for acquiring SARS when 
HCWs consistently wore a mask (N95 or surgical) was 0.23 (95% CI, 0.07 to 
0.78). When consistent use of a N95 mask was compared with inconsistent use a 
mask, the RR for infection was 0.22 (95% CI, 0.05 to 0.93). When consistent use 
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of a surgical mask was compared with inconsistent use of a mask, the RR was 
0.45 (95% CI, 0.07 to 2.71). Comparing consistent use ofN95 mask versus 
consistent use of a surgical mask, the RR was 0.5 (95% CI, 0.06 to 4.23). The RR 
for use ofboth gowns and gloves was not statistically significant. No multivariate 
analysis was performed. 
Lau and colleagues47 reported on use ofPPE, perceived inadequacy of 
PPE supply, and problems with PPE use. Univariate analysis for all types ofPPE 
use was stratified into three settings based on history ofHCW contact with 
patients: direct contact with SARS patient; direct contact with patients in general; 
and no patient contact. The OR was reported as the risk from inconsistent use of 
different types ofPPE. Due to the fact that nearly every HCW reported wearing 
either a N95 or surgical mask in all three settings, the OR for inconsistent use of 
any type of mask was not statistically significant. The unadjusted OR for 
inconsistent use of goggles when in direct contact with SARS patients was 6.41 
(95% CI, 2.49 to 19.49). The unadjusted OR for inconsistent use of a gown when 
in direct contact with a SARS patient was 8.85 (95% CI, 2.46 to 48.28). The 
unadjusted OR for inconsistent use of gloves when in direct contact with SARS 
patients was 20.54 (95% CI, 2.96 to 887.72). In multivariate analysis, 
inconsistent use of more than one type of PPE when having direct contact with 
SARS patients had an adjusted OR of5.06 (95% CI, 1.91 to 598.92). 
During the time period of the study there was a perceived or actual 
shortage of the various types ofPPE used by HCWs to protect against SARS 
transmission. The actual supply levels of the various PPE items were not verified 
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by the study. The adjusted OR for perceived inadequacy ofPPE supply was 4.27 
(95% CI, 1.66 to 12.54). 
Hand hygiene 
Three studies46.47•50 reported results on the effects of hand hygiene on 
preventing SARS transmission to HCWs. Seto and associates50 reported a 
protective OR for handwashing of 5 (95% CI, 1 to 19), however handwashing was 
not found to be statistically significant in multivariate analysis and was dropped 
from the logistic regression model. In contrast, multivariate analysis by Teleman 
et al46 found that handwashing after each patient had an adjusted OR for SARS 
transmission of0.07 (95% CI, 0.008 to 0.7). Lau and colleagues47 reported that 
>97% of both cases and controls practiced good hand hygiene after contact with 
SARS patients or patients in general, and thus the OR difference between the case 
and control group was not statistically significant. However, the OR for 
inconsistent hand hygiene when there was no patient contact was reported as 6.38 
(95% CI, 1.64 to 36.17). 
DISCUSSION 
Factors associated with an increased risk of SARS transmission from 
infected patient to HCW s include contact with respiratory secretions, exposure to 
aerosol generating procedures, duration of exposure to SARS patients, duration of 
infection control training, and perceived inadequacy of PPE supply. Protective 
factors associated with a reduced risk of SARS transmission to HCWs include 
wear of a mask and hand hygiene. 
19 
The available evidence supports respiratory droplet transmission as a 
primary mode for SARS to spread from infected patient to HCW in the healthcare 
setting. The role of contact transmission remains less clearly defined. While 
hand hygiene appeared to reduce the risk of SARS infection, the use of gloves 
failed to significantly decrease the risk of transmission to HCWs caring for SARS 
infected patients. Patient care activities associated with aerosol generating 
procedures represent a significant risk to HCWs caring for SARS patients. 
However, the evidence reviewed does not support widespread aerosolization of 
SARS-Co V in hospital settings. 
Scales et a] showed evidence of a dose-response relationship with risk of 
SARS transmission to HCW s increasing as time spent in proximity to an infected 
patient increased. On the other hand, the results ofTeleman and colleagues did 
not support this relationship. 
The importance of infection control training was highlighted by Lau and 
associates. Decreased length of time spent in infection control training was 
associated with decreased understanding of personal protective measures and 
significantly related to an increased risk of SARS transmission. The reduced risk 
of SARS transmission conferred by hand hygiene also attests to the importance of 
infection control training in the healthcare setting. 
Wearing any type of mask while caring for SARS infected patients 
reduced the risk of transmission to HCWs by as much as twelve times, and was 
the only PPE item shown to be statistically significant in protecting HCWs from 
infection. A side-by-side comparison ofN95 versus surgical mask by Loeb et al 
20 
favored N95 masks, but this difference was not statistically significant. In 
resource poor countries surgical masks may be recommended. However, if 
patient factors (persistent coughing, high viral shedding) or aerosol generating 
procedures are being performed then the use of an N95 respirator should be 
encouraged. 51 When possible an N95 respirator should be used because of 
improved filtering efficacy, in the absence of demonstrated clinical/epidemiologic 
superiority. The use of a powered air purifying respirator (P APR) should be 
considered during aerosol generating procedures, although again neither clinical 
nor epidemiologic studies evaluated the effectiveness of this means of respiratory 
protection. 
During the initial response to the global SARS outbreak, infection control 
guidelines and PPE requirements were in a perpetual state of refinement. In the 
United States, recommended infection control practices quickly evolved to 
include placement of SARS patients in a room meeting airborne protection 
requirements (i.e., negative-pressure, direct out exhausted air, and >6 air-
exchanges per hour), N95 or higher level of respiratory protection, gloves, gown, 
eye protection (goggles or face shield), and hand hygiene.23'39 These published 
infection control guidelines represent the ideal. Out of necessity, treatment of 
SARS infected patients in other countries occasionally took place under less than 
optimal conditions due to failures in early recognition of the disease, 14•45•52 lack of 
properly designed isolation facilities, 53•54 or inadequate PPE supplies. 54•55 
The finding that inconsistent use of more than one type ofPPE when 
having direct contact with a SARS patient significantly increased the risk of 
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SARS transmission is not surprising. All studies in this review measured PPE use 
as a dichotomous or categorical variable (i.e., "inconsistent use" or "most of the 
time"). Use of more precisely defined categories or quantitative measures might 
have allowed for a clearer understanding of the role of various types ofPPE in 
preventing SARS transmission. However, to accomplish this type of data analysis 
requires a prospective data collection approach to ensure validity. 
During the 2003 SARS outbreak, countries reported wide variation in the 
level ofSARS transmission to HCWs. While China, Canada, and Singapore 
reported high numbers ofHCWs infected, healthcare facilities in the United States 
reported no transmission to HCWs despite numerous unprotected exposures.56 A 
survey of U.S. HCWs who reported known unprotected exposure to a SARS 
infected patient revealed the most likely neglected forms ofPPE were gloves 
(39%), mask (44%), and eye protection (70%). Reasons suggested for the lack of 
SARS transmission to HCWs in the U.S. healthcare settings included the small 
number of SARS cases in the US (N=8), patients who were less infectious and a 
relative lack of high-risk patient procedures performed. 56 
Selected healthcare facilities53 or wards 57 in other countries also reported 
zero SARS cases among HCWs. Among HCWs on the SARS ward in a Vietnam 
hospital, only 90% reported always wearing an N95 mask and HCWs reported 
using gloves only 76% of the time. 53 Proposed rationale for the lack of 
transmission were similar to those for U.S. facilities. In contrast, a pediatric ward 
in Hong Kong managed to prevent SARS transmission by employing a 
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conservative triage policy and enforcing the proper donning and removal ofPPE 
by having a nurse monitor other HCWs.57 
None of the studies included in this systematic review attempted to 
determine the proportion ofHCWs who properly wore PPE or the significance of 
contact transmission during PPE removal. The proper donning and removal of 
PPE entails a methodical process and failure to adhere to the prescribed sequence 
for PPE removal can lead to exposure. Recommendations for putting on and 
removing PPE have been published,57.59 and CDC guidelines are included at 
Appendix 3. However, it should be noted that none of these PPE donning and 
removal recommendations have been validated as to whether they actually reduce 
or prevent SARS transmission. 
On the other end ofthe PPE use continuum are examples ofHCWs 
acquiring SARS despite apparent adherence to infection control 
recommendations.23•60•61 In an intensive care unit in Toronto, 9 HCWs exposed to 
a laboratory confirmed SARS patient developed suspected or probable SARS?3 
Infected HCWs reported wearing all recommended PPE each time they entered 
the patient's room. Several reasons were offered as to why full PPE apparently 
failed to prevent SARS transmission. First, HCWs had not been fit tested prior to 
wearing a PCM2000 duckbill mask, as is required in the United States. Secondly, 
the masks used were N95 equivalent that met Canadian public health 
recommendations, but were not National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health approved. Third, the patient had a nearly constant cough prior to 
intubation and was subsequently maintained on high-frequency oscillatory 
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ventilation for 7 days. The coughing, intubation, and ventilation may have 
generated aerosols leading to limited airborne spread for which the level of 
respiratory protection used did not prevent transmission. Finally, exposure may 
have occurred during PPE removal as HCWs did not have a clear understanding 
of how to remove PPE without contaminating themselves.23 
Synthesizing the results of the reviewed studies with other published case 
reports leads to several conclusions. The primary mode ofSARS transmission in 
healthcare settings involves respiratory droplets, while contact and opportunistic 
airborne transmission also occurred. Use of a mask by HCWs when caring for 
SARS patients provides significant protection against disease transmission. 
Furthermore, lapses in infection control policy, training, and individual use by 
HCWs contribute to an increased risk for SARS transmission. 
Despite the modest efforts by researchers to characterize risk factors for 
transmission in the studies reviewed for this paper, gaps in our knowledge of 
SARS transmission persist. The actual roles of contact and airborne transmission 
within the healthcare setting remain indeterminate. Also, the wide confidence 
interval for each of the presented relative risks or odd ratios indicates the degree 
of uncertainty associated with the point estimate and small size of the study 
samples. Finally, the factors that contribute to certain patients being more 
infectious than others remains poorly defined. 
The SARS outbreak represented a wake up call for the global healthcare 
community, as lapses in infection control practices significantly contributed to the 
nosocomial transmission of SARS. In order to improve hospital preparedness for 
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possible future disease outbreaks, efforts in enhancing infection control training 
must be a priority. Standardizing and improving the quality of research 
conducted in the face of a disease outbreak is another area deserving of attention. 
Enhancing Hospital Infection Control 
Based upon the best evidence available at the time, affected countries 
implemented infection control measures in hospitals and community settings that 
effectively brought about an end the SARS outbreak. To foster preparedness 
within healthcare settings for a return of SARS or the possible emergence of 
another communicable disease, it is necessary to evaluate the lessons learned from 
the 2003 SARS outbreak. 
Routine infection control training must emphasize when, how and why to 
use PPE. Other aspects of infection control training include the proper sequence 
for removing PPE to avoid self contamination and the importance of performing 
hand hygiene, especially when leaving patient rooms. 17 An assessment of 
comprehension and a demonstration of task proficiency should be built into 
infection control training. Consistency of PPE use needs to be part of the 
everyday culture of care, and shortcuts that ignore PPE use for expediency should 
not be acceptable. The actions and emphasis placed on occupational health and 
safety by management can go a long way towards setting the tone for the safety 
climate within healthcare settings. 62•63 
During a recognized disease outbreak, time must be allotted for refresher 
training on infection controL Such training would convey what is known and 
what actions need to be taken by HCW s to reduce the risk of acquiring the current 
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disease threat. Proactive monitoring of infection control practices and PPE use by 
"sitters" or "buddy checks" needs to take place to ensure HCWs are complying 
with all recommendations?8•57•60•64 Such monitoring would be especially 
important in high risk areas such as isolation rooms and critical care units. This 
would help to reinforce the importance of infection control measures and allow 
for on the spot corrections. 
The rapid recognition and isolation of potentially infectious patients is a 
key aspect in minimizing disease transmission in the healthcare setting. With 
regards to SARS, this process is complicated by nonspecific initial symptoms/2•33 
atypical presentations, 14'65 and limited sensitivity and specificity of surveillance 
criteria.66.68 To compensate for the lack of early definitive indicators ofSARS, a 
conservative approach to triage49'57•64•69 and initial isolation39 of potentially 
infectious patients is often preferable to waiting until a confirmed diagnosis is 
made. 
hnplementation of universal respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette 
practices in healthcare facilities should decrease the risk of SARS transmission to 
HCWs from unrecognized patients, as well as facilitate control of nosocomial 
spread of other common respiratory pathogens. 69'70 Another aspect of infection 
control requiring consideration during an outbreak is to determine what 
procedures pose the greatest risk for disease transmission to HCWs. In the case 
of SARS, aerosol generating procedures such as intubation and nebulized 
medications posed a significant risk to HCWs for disease transmission. Once 
26 
recognized, task specific control measures should be established60•71 and 
appropriate guidelines widely disseminated via electronic means. 
The final aspect of infection control to address in the planning phase for 
an outbreak is how to actively conduct surveillance for additional cases within the 
healthcare setting. A system for monitoring patients in all wards for signs 
suggestive of infection is one component. The other is to monitor and exclude 
potentially exposed HCWs. During the SARS outbreak, daily symptom screening 
and temperature checks were employed to identify HCWS as early as possible and 
keep them from possibly exposing other HCWs or patients.25'52•72•73 Dwosh and 
associates reported that SARS screening identified 3 of 10 HCWs when they 
arrived for work at a Toronto hospital.73 Similarly, Gopalakrishna et al found 
fever surveillance rapidly identified potentially infected HCWs in SARS affected 
healthcare facilities in Singapore.72 
Planning Future Studies 
The quantitative data reviewed in this paper is based upon surveying less 
than 9% of the 1,700 HCWs who were infected with SARS. Researchers must do 
a better job in conducting studies ofHCWs during outbreaks in order to increase 
our understanding of transmission risks associated with certain procedures and 
risk reduction provided by PPE. 
Instead of reacting to the uncertainties of a novel disease outbreak with 
hastily conducted studies, planning and preparation must be undertaken ahead of 
the next disease outbreak. By establishing a template for collecting and analyzing 
data on transmission risk factors, researchers could potentially conduct 
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prospective cohort studies as the outbreak unfolded. This would increase the 
accuracy of exposure measurements and greatly minimize recall bias. 
Preplanning would also spur discussion on a standardized approach to evaluating 
exposure risk, which would allow for ready comparison of results between 
studies. An established set of demographic and background characteristics on 
study subjects would help recognize the potential for selection bias, which if 
found could possibly be controlled for by stratifying the groups on a given 
characteristic. 
Nurses, physicians, administrative support, and housekeeping personnel 
represent the core components of the healthcare staff required to keep a hospital 
functioning. Unless we put a greater emphasis on ensuring these HCWs are 
protected from nosocomial disease transmission, we run the risk of not having this 
HCW pool available or willing to care for infected patients during future disease 
outbreaks. We need to make certain healthcare worker safety receives as much 
attention as patient safety within healthcare settings. Establishing a 'culture of 
infection control' and preplanning for future research efforts during an outbreak 
represent two ways for HCWs to gain the essential advantage over the next viral 
or bacterial adversary. 
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Figure. Geographic Areas Most Affected by SARS: Summary of Probable Cases with Onset of Illness from 1 November 2002 
to 31 July 2003 
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Table 1. Risk Factors Associated with Transmission of SARS from Patient to Healthcare Worker* 
Author (Reference) 
Loeb eta! (21) 
Fowler et al (22) 
Scales et a! ( 45) 
Teleman et a! ( 46) 



















Suctioning before intubation 
Manipulation of oxygen mask 
HCW involved with intubation 
Nurse assisting with intubation 
Physician performing intubation 
Caring for patient receiving NPPV 
Caring for patient receiving HFO 
HCW spending ?:3 I min in patient's room 
HCW spending >4 hours in patient's room 
Caring for patient receiving NPPV (?31 min) 
Contact with respiratory secretions 
Case-Control Perceived inadequacy ofPPE supply 
SARS infection control training ( <2 hrs or none) 
Inconsistent use of more than one type ofPPE 
when having direct contact with a SARS patient 
Result 
Unadjusted RR (95% CI) 
4.20 (1.58 to 11.14) 
4.20 (1.58 to 11.14) 
9.00 (1.25 to 64.89) 
Unadjusted RR (95% CI) 
13.29 (2.99 to 59.04) 
21.38 (4.89 to 93.37) 
3.82 (0.23 to 62.24) 
2.33 (0.25 to 21.76) 
0.74 (0.11 to 4.92) 
Unadjusted OR (95% CI) 
12.9(1.27to 131) 
24.0 (1.85 to 311) 
105 (3 to 3,035) 
Adjusted OR (95% CI) 1 
21.8 (1.7 to 274.8) 
Adjusted OR (95% CI)2 
4.27 (1.66 to 12.54) 
13.6 (1.24 to 27.50) 









* CI =Confidence Interval; HCW = Healthcare Worker; HFO =High-Frequency Oscillatory; NNPV =Noninvasive Positive-Pressure Ventilation; OR= Odds 
Ratio; PPE =Personal Protective Equipment; RR = Relative Risk. 
1 Forward logistic regression analysis including gender, ethnic group, N95 masks, gloves, gowns, handwashing, and contact with respiratory secretions. 
2 Forward stepwise logistic regression including inconsistent use of at least 1 type ofPPE when having contact with SARS patients, with "patients in general," 
when there was "no patient contact," when SARS infection control training was <2 hours, when the respondent reported not understanding SARS infection 
control procedures, when at least 1 piece ofPPE was perceived to be in inadequate supply, and hand hygiene was inconsistent when there was no patient contact. 
1 Definitions of quality ratings. Good: Well designed, conducted and reported studies involving HCWs in hospital setting. Fair: Strength of the evidence is 
limited by mild to moderate potential for selection bias, measurement bias, or confounding. Poor: Strength of the evidence is negated by moderate to high 
potential for selection bias, measurement bias, or confounding. 
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Table 2. Protective Factors Associated with Transmission of SARS from Patient to Healthcare Worker* 
Author (Reference) Location Study Design Protective Factor Result Quality Ratiug1 
Internal External 
Validity Validity 
Loeb et al (21) Toronto Retrospective 
Cohort 
Unadjusted RR (95% CI) 
0.23 (0.07 to 0.78) 
Fair Good 
Scales et al ( 45) 
Teleman et al (46) 









N95 or surgical mask 
N95 (vs. no mask) 
Surgical mask (vs. no mask) 
N95 vs. surgical mask 
Use of gloves during patient contact 
N95 mask 
Handwashing after each patient 
Mask (N95, surgical, or paper) 
Hand washing 
* CI = Confidence Interval; OR= Odds Ratio; RR = Relative Risk. 
0.22 (0.05 to 0.93) 
0.45 (0.07 to 2.71) 
0.50 (0.06 to 4.23) 
Unadjusted OR (95% CI) 
0.08 (0.01 to 1.11) 
Adjusted OR (95% CI) 1 
0.1 (0.02 to 0.9) 
0.07 (0.008 to 0.7) 
Adjusted OR (95% CI)2 
0.08 (0.02 to 0.33)3 




1 Forward logistic regression analysis including gender, ethnic group, N95 masks, gloves, gowns, handwashing, and contact with respiratory secretions. 
2 Forward stepwise logistic regression including use of masks, gowns, gloves, and handwashing. 
3 Reciprocal value of reported protective measure. 
t Definitions of quality ratings. Good: Well designed, conducted and reported studies involving HCWs in hospital setting. Fair: Strength of the evidence is 
limited by mild to moderate potential for selection bias, measurement bias, or confounding. Poor: Strength of the evidence is negated by moderate to high 
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t: 
Loeb Metal. SARS among critical care nurses, Toronto. Emerg InfDis. 
2004; 10:251-5. 
- Q: Hypothesized that patient care activities that increase exposure 
HCW s to respiratory droplets are associated with an increased risk of 
SARS transmission and use of masks is protective. 
cohort. 
- 43 nurses who cared for 3 probable SARS patients (subsequently 
laboratory confirmed) on two critical care units in a Toronto hospital 
from March 8-21,2003. 
- 32 nurses who entered a SARS patient's room at least once; 11 nurses 
who worked on the critical care units during this time had not entered the 
room of a SARS patient and were not included in the analysis. 
- 8 nurses were infected with SARS (4 probable and 4 suspected) (Health 
Canada~ WHO defmition); all laboratory confirmed cases by serology. 
-All cohort HCWs were female nurses; mean age 41 years (range 27-
65); 2 with previous history of respiratory illoess (I with asdrma, 1 with 
bronchitis); no other demographic or background data provided. 
-Not able to compare groups with information provided in article. 
-None. 
- Potential for selection bias is assessed as low to moderate due to the 
lack of demographic data necessary to assess comparability of groups; 
the specific definition of the cohort and the use of serology to confirm 
the SARS diagnosis in both the nurses and the 3 source patients is a 
moderating factor in this rating. 
-Cohort demographic data collected (age, sex, medical history, smoking, 
and use of immunosuppressive medications. 
- Trained research nurses abstracted data from source patient charts as to 
type and duration of patient care activities performed by the nurses, 
matched to their signature; also recorded the types ofPPE and the 
duration and frequency of use from the charts; nurses interviewed about 
the specific care provided; information provided by the nurses was 
corroborated whenever possible by data from the charts. 
- Data on 33 patient care activities were collected. 
-!>. 
v. 
-Potential for measurement bias is assessed as low based on the 
use of patient charts to corroborate nurses' recall. 
- Potential confounders include: frequency and duration of 
exposure to SARS patient; actual viral load shed by individual 
SARS patients (unmeasured) during period of nurse care; actual 
and proper use ofPPE by critical care nurses during patient care; 
potential for conununity acquired SARS from an uurecognized 
contact; age ofHCW; pre-existing health ofHCW. 
- Potential for confounding is assessed as moderate. 
-No multivariate analysis performed. 
-Intubation: RR 4.20 (95% CI 1.58 to 11.14); suctioning before 
intubation RR 4.20 (1.58 to 11.14); manipulation of oxygen mask 
RR 9.00 (1.25 to 64.89); all other patient care activities were not 
statistically significant. 
- N95 mask or surgical mask (consistent use vs. inconsistent use) 
RR 0.23 (0.07 to 0.78); N95 mask (mask vs. no mask) RR 0.22 
(0.05 to 0.93): N95 vs. surgical mask RR 0.50 
-Aerosol generating procedures (intubation, suctioning, and 
oxygen mask manipulation) increase the risk of SARS 
transmission to HCW s assisting or performing care; the consistent 
use of s N95 mask (or any consistent use of a mask) provides 
from SARS transmission. 
- Internal validity is assessed as fair; while the relative risk for 
many patient care activities were actually examined, only the 
originally hypothesized activities proved to be significant. 
- External validity is assessed as good, due to the specific nature of 
the occupational group to which the study results would be 
generalized to. 
- Findings are consistent with results from other studies; exposure 
to aerosol generating procedures increased the risk of SARS 
transmission; lack of transmission to HCW who had not entered a 
SARS patient's room implicates either droplet or limited aerosol 
generation as a means of transmission to HCW s; environmental 
transmission (i.e., contact through gown) not implicated. 
-Fowler RA et al. Transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
during intubation and mechanical ventilation. Am J Respir Crit Care 
11ed.2004; 169:1198-1202. 
- Q: To determine whether specific ventilatory strategies were associated 
with an increased risk of SARS transmission from patient to HCW. 
- Design: Retrospective cohort. 
- 122 HCWs exposed to 7 SARS patients (diagnosis not defmed; 
laboratory confirmation not discussed) in a hospital ICU in Toronto from 
Aprill-22, 2003. 
- 76 HCWs having any involvement with intubation of 6 SARS patients 
in a hospital ICU in Toronto fromAprill-22, 2003. 
- 10 HCWs developed probable SARS (source of case defmition not 
defmed); 9 HCWs laboratory confirmed by PCR or serology; 1 HCW did 
not have either test performed. 
-All patients treated in negative pressure isolation rooms; all HCWs 
wore gloves, gowns, N95/PC112000 masks, and hairnets; eye or face 
shields were variably used. 
-The mean age ofHCWs with SARS was 35.1 ± 6.5 years and 36.2 ± 
4.7 years among those without SARS (p ~ 0.7); no other demographic or 
background information provided . 
.j:>. 1 -Not able to compare groups with information provided in article. 
0, 
-None mentioned. 
- Potential for selection bias is assessed as moderate due to the lack of 
demographic data necessary to assess comparability of groups; also 
problematic was the lack of laboratory coillumation of the 7 SARS 
patients; however the cohort ofHCWs performing the specific 
procedures was fairly well defmed and serology was used to coufum the 
SARS diagnosis in the HCWs (9 out of 
-No mention made of how information was gathered. 
- Restricted analysis to 3 respiratory practices: physiciaus who performed 
intubation or nurses who assisted (vs. HCWs who treated SARS patients, 
but were not present for intubation); nurses who cared for SARS patients 
receiving noninvasive positive-pressure ventilation (NPPV); nurses who 
cared for patients with high-frequency oscillatory (HFO) ventilation (last 




- Potential for measurement bias is assessed as moderate to high; 
while the outcome measures were fairly well spelled out, the lack 
of discussion on how the information was gathered or verified 
dowu grades the validity of the data. 
- Potential confounders include: frequency and duration of 
exposure to SARS patient; actual viral load shed by individual 
SARS patients (unmeasured) during period of care; actual and 
proper use ofPPE by HCWs during patient care; potential for 
community acquired SARS from an unrecognized contact; age of 
HCW; pre-existing health ofHCW. 
- Potential for confounding is assessed as moderate. 
-No multivariate analysis performed. 
- HCW involved with intubation RR 13.29 (95% CI 2.99 to 59.04); 
nurses involved with intubation RR 21.28 ( 4.89 to 93.37); 
physicians performing intubation 3.82 (0.23 to 62.24); caring for 
patient treated with NPPV RR 2.33 (0.25 to 21.76); caring for 
patient treated with HFO RR 0.74 (0.11 to 4.92). 
- Nurses assisting with endotracheal intubation are at increased 
risk for contracting SARS; physicians who perform intubation also 
appear to be at increased risk, but this association did not reach 
statistical significance. 
- Internal validity is assessed as fair to poor due to the inadequate 
reporting of how the data was gathered and the lack of cohort 
characteristics for assessing comparability. 
-External validity is assessed as fair to poor (in keeping with the 
equivalent assessment of internal validity). 
- While the fmdings from this study are affected by the poor 
internal validity, they are consistent with other studies; exposure to 
aerosol generating procedures increased the risk of SARS 
transmission to HCWs. 
- Scales DC eta!. Illness in intensive care staff after brief exposure to 
severe acute respiratory syndrome. Emerg InfDis. 2003; 10:1205-10. 
- Q: Not explicitly stated in article; what factors are associated with 
SARS transmission after brief unexpected exposure to a patient with 
undiagnosed SARS (later laboratory confirmed). 
cohort. 
- 69 HCW considered to be at high risk for developing SARS due to 
exposure to I SARS patient from 23-24 March 2003 in a Toronto 
hospital ICU; HCWs either entered the patient's room or had been in the 
ICU >4 hours during the patients 30.75 hour stay; HCWs quarantined. 
-Unit of analysis was 31 HCW s who entered the index patient's room. 
- SARS developed in 6 HCWs (5 probable, I suspected; WHO SARS 
case defmitions) who entered the patient's room. 
- SARS developed in I HCW who had not entered the index patient's 
room, but who was in the larger cohort of 69 HCWs quarantined. 
- HCWs should have been taking precautions for suspected methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus. 
-No demographic information provided; the only background 
information provided was that one HCW in the cohort had a history of 
type II diabetes mellitus, while all other HCWs were previously healthy . 
.~>- 1 -Not able to compare groups with information provided in article. 
00 
- 63 of the 69 HCWs were interviewed, 5 declined and I could not be 
contacted. 
- SARS did not develop in any HCW s not quarantined. 
- Potential for selection bias is assessed as moderate due to the lack of 
demographic data necessary to assess comparability of groups; also 
contributing to this rating were the arbitrary defmition of the quarantined 
cohort (on the ICU >4 hours) and the lack oflaboratory confmnation of 
SARS in these 7 HCWs. 
- HCWs were interviewed by two researchers using a structured 
questionnaire; information collected included: personal demographic and 
health information, length of exposure, exposure proximity, procedures 




- Potential for measurement bias is assessed as low based on the 
short time of exposure to only one source patient and the fact that 
the information was collected shortly after the exposure. 
- Potential confounders include: actual viral load shed by 
individual SARS source patients (unmeasured) during period of 
care; actual and proper use ofPPE by HCWs during patient care; 
potential for conununity acquired SARS from an unrecognized 
contact; age ofHCW; pre-existing health ofHCW. 
- Potential for confounding is assessed as moderate. 
- Classification and regression tree methods were used to identify 
predictors of developing SARS; no multivariate analysis 
performed. 
- OfHCWs who entered the patienfs room: 2:31 min OR 12.9 
(95% CI 1.27 to 131); 2:4 hours OR 24.0 (1.85 to 311); present in 
room for 2:31 min during administration ofNPPV OR 105 (3 to 
3,035); use of gloves when having contact with SARS patient's 
mucous membranes or respiratory secretions OR 0.08 (0.01 to 
1.11). SARS developed in 1 HCW despite wearing N95 mask, 
gloves, and gown (note: no eye protection; not fit-tested for mask). 
- Results suggest that the greatest risk for SARS transmission 
occurs in those HCWs with prolonged exposure or direct contact 
with a SARS infected patient. The fact that 1 HCW acquired 
SARS without entering the patient's room suggests transmission 
indirect contact with contaminated 
- Internal validity is assessed as fair due to low potential for 
measurement bias, and moderate potential for selection bias and 
confounding. 
- External validity is assessed as good, due to the specific nature of 
the occupational group to which the study results would be 
generalized to. 
- Findings are consistent with results from other studies; proximity 
and duration of contact with a SARS patient are associated with 
risk for transmission to HCW s; 
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- Lau JTF et al. SARS Transmission among hospital workers in Hong 
Kong. Emerg InfDis. 2004; 10:280-6. 
- Q: What factors were associated with breakthrough transmission of the 
SARS virus among hospital workers infected in hospital settings? 
- Design: 1:2 Matched case-control. 
- HCWs who cared for 453 laboratory confirmed SARS patients in wards 
of a cluster of five hospitals in Hong Kong from March 28 to May 25, 
2003. 
-72 HCWs (out of77; 93.5%) with probable or suspected SARS (WHO 
case definitions; all subsequently laboratory confirmed); as all staff was 
required to use protective masks from March 12, 2003, these HCWs 
were presumed to have contracted the virus as a result of "breakthrough" 
transmission. 
- Each case matched to healthy HCW who had been working in the same 
job position, in the same ward, and in proximity with the case-patient. 
- No description of case or control groups other than aggregate totals of 
job category and where they were employed. 
-No demographic or background information provided. 
-None. 
- Potential for selection bias is assessed as moderate, based on the lack of 
demographic data to assess comparability of case and control groups, and 
the selection of the control group through a combination of nomination 
process by infected HCWs and an nndefrned random selection from the 
duty roster of the day before the case felt nnwell, matching for job type. 
- An infection control nurse administered a structured questionnaire to 
both groups; questions reviewed exposure (3 categories: direct exposure 
with SARS patient, contact with patients in general, no patient contact), 
social contact with others who were later fonnd to be SARS cases, 
present during high risk procedures, wear of PPE (N95 or surgical mask, 
gloves, goggles, gowns, cap), problems with wear ofPPE, perceived 
adequacy ofPPE supply, and length of SARS infection control training. 
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- Potential for measurement bias is assessed as low to moderate; 
duration and number of potential interactions with individual 
SARS patients; potential for recall bias, and lack of verification of 
questiolUlaire data with patient charts were factors in assessment. 
- Potential confounders include: differences in actual length of 
exposure to SARS patients between cases and control; actual viral 
load shed by individual SARS source patients ( uruneasured) 
during period of care; actual and proper use ofPPE by HCWs 
during patient care; age ofHCW; pre-existing health ofHCW. 
- Social contact with SARS patients taken into consideration. 
- Potential for confounding is assessed as low to moderate. 
- Rather broad study question led to the calculation of some 50 
separate ORs. 
- Forward stepwise logistic regression. 
-Adjusted OR: perceived inadequacy ofPPE supply OR 4.27 
(1.66 to 12.54); SARS infection control training <2 hrs of no 
training OR 13.6 (1.24 to 27.50); inconsistent use of more than one 
type of PPE when having direct contact with a SARS patient OR 
5.06 (1.91 to 598.92); did not understand infection control 
measures OR 3.14 (1.35 to 7.73); no significant difference for 
those who performed high-risk procedures on SARS 
- In order to prevent transmission of SARS from patient to HCW, 
there must be sufficient time allotted for infection control training 
to ensure HCWs understand IC measures and how to utilize PPE; 
provide regular updates as situations warrant; must manage PPE 
to ensure 
- Internal validity is assessed as fair to due to moderate potential 
for selection bias, measurement bias, and confounding in this 
study. 
- External validity is assessed as good, due to the specific nature of 
the occupational group to which the study results would be 
generalized to. 
- While defmitive conclusions cannot be drawn based upon the 
risk factors identified as significant in this study, the findings are 
consistent with findings from other authors during the same time 
period and potentially present unique insight into the importance 
of infection control training. 
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- Teleman MD et al. Factors associated with transmission of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome among health-care workers in Singapore. 
Epidemiol Infect. 2004; 132:797-803. 
- Q: Risk and protective factors for nosocomial transmission of SARS in 
Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore. 
- Design: Case-control. 
- HCWs from SARS-affected wards who reported exposure (being 
within I meter) to 3 source patients with probable SARS (all3 
subsequently laboratory confirmed). 
-Cases were HCWs admitted March 1-31, 2003; diagnosis based upon 
WHO criteria; all cases were subsequently laboratory confmned by 
serology; 36 of 44 infected HCWs (82%) were recruited (6 were too ill to 
be interviewed and 2 died before they could be interviewed. 
-Controls were 50 HCWs working in the same wards as the cases, with 
history of exposure (being within 1 meter) but who did not develop 
SARS (size ofHCW pool not defmed). 
- Demographic data provided on gender, age ( <30, 2:30), comorbid 
conditions, and etlmicity). 
- The two groups were fairly comparable, with the only significant 
difference being a higher Chinese etlmicity within the case group; the 
age of the control group was slightly older than the cases; the presence of 
comorbid conditions (not defmed) was comparable between the case and 
control group (16.7% vs. 18.0%). 
-None. 
- The potential for selection bias is assessed as low to moderate, as the 
two groups were fairly comparable but the process for selecting controls 
from the pool of exposed HCWs was not described. 
- Telephone interviews by staff experienced in epidemiological 
investigation using a closed questionnaire; information collected 
included demographic data, occupation, medical history within previous 
5 years, and history of performing procedures with transmission risk; 
also questioned on compliance with PPE recommendations; no 
information provided as to if interviewers were blinded. 
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- Potential for measurement bias is assessed as low to moderate; 
while the outcome measures were fairly well spelled out, the 
length of time covered and recall bias played a factor in down 
grading this rating. 
- Potential confounders include: frequency and duration of 
exposure to SARS patient; actual viral load shed by individual 
SARS patients (unmeasured) during period of care; actual and 
proper use ofPPE by HCWs during patient care; potential for 
community acquired SARS from an uurecognized contact. 
- Potential for confounding is assessed as moderate. 
- Forward logistic regression analysis. 
-Univariate analysis: contact with respiratory secretions OR 6.9 
(95% CI 1.4 to 34.6); handwashing after each patient OR 0.06 
(0.007 to 0.5); wearing N95 masks when attending to patients OR 
0.1 (0.03 to 0.4). 
- Multivariate analysis: contact with respiratory secretions adjusted 
OR 21.8 (1.7 to 274.8); handwashing adjusted OR 0.07 (0.008 to 
controlling for gender, ethoicity, N95 mask, gloves, gown. 
- Contact with respiratory secretions from SARS patients is 
associated with a significant risk of SARS transmission to HCWs; 
handwashing after attending patients is strongly protective against 
transmission of SARS. 
- Internal validity is assessed as fair; while selection bias and 
measurement bias were fairly well controlled, the uncertainty over 
the influence of confounding factors potentially affects the resnlts. 
- External validity is assessed as good, due to the specific nature of 
the occupational group to which the study results would be 
generalized to. 
- Findings are consistent with results from other studies; provides . 
evidence for contact, both direct and indirect, with respiratory 
secretions or body fluids, as a major risk factor for transmission in 
the hospital setting; personal protective measures against droplet 
spread and contact are effective against SARS transmission. 
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- Seto WH eta!. Effectiveness of precautions against droplets and 
contact in prevention of nosocomial transmission of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS). Lancet. 2003; 316:1519-20. 
- Q: Assess the effectiveness of droplet precautions for prevention of 
nosocomial transmission of SARS from patients to HCWs. 
- Design: Case-control. 
- HCWs from 5 Hong Kong hospitals exposed to (coming within 3 feet) 
11 SARS patients; a sixth hospital was excluded due to a large outbreak 
involving a drug nebulizer used on an index patient for> 10 days (reason 
-droplet precautions not effective for aerosol-generating procedures). 
- 13 HCWs acquired SARS (own case defmition; infected HCWs were 
those who acquired SARS 2-7 days after exposure, with no exposure to 
cases outside the hospital; 1 HCW had no exposure to any admitted 
SARS patient and was classified as a community acquired case); all 
index patients and HCWs with SARS, except one, were laboratory 
confmned. 
- 241 non-infected controls; 356 questionnaires returned (85% of staff on 
roster for affected wards), out of which 102 were excluded due to no 
contact with SARS patient; 
- Limited demographic data reported (gender, occupation, and nnit). 
-Not able to compare groups with information provided in article. 
-Information on use ofPPE collected from alll3 infected HCWs; 
questionnaires not returned from 15% of non-infected HCWs (-60). 
- Potential for selection bias is assessed as low to moderate due to the 
lack of demographic data necessary to assess comparability of groups; 
the specific defmition of the cohort and the use of serology to confmn 
the SARS diagnosis in both the 13 HCWs and the 11 index patients is a 
moderating factor in this rating. 
- Questionnaire used to collect data from infected and non-infected staff 
on the current roster in the clinical wards providing care for the index 
patients with SARS; those who had cared for SARS patients were asked 
about use of masks (paper, surgical, or N95), gloves, gowns, and 
handwashing; responses were yes, most of the time, or no; survey 
conducted March 15-24, 2003. 
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- Potential for measurement bias is assessed as low to moderate; 
while outcome measures were fairly well spelled out, there was a 
likelihood of multiple exposures over an undefmed period of time 
and there was no corroboration ofHCW recall with patient charts. 
- Potential confounders include: frequency and duration of 
exposure to SARS patient; actual viral load shed by individual 
SARS patients (unmeasured) during period of care; actual and 
proper use ofPPE by HCWs during patient care; potential for 
community acquired SARS from an unrecognized contact; age of 
HCW; pre-existing health ofHCW. 
- Potential for confounding is assessed as moderate. 
- Forward stepwise logistic regression of four factors; "yes" and 
"most of the time" were grouped together in the analysis. 
The OR for HCWs who used a mask of not getting infected 
(protective measure) was 13 (95% CI 3 to 60), controlling for the 
other three variables measured; protective OR for handwashing 
was 5 (I to 19), controlling for the other three variables; staff who 
wore surgical and N95 masks were significantly associated with 
non-infection, but this was not seen with paper masks; no staff 
who used all four measures became infected. 
~Precautions against droplet and contact are adequate for 
prevention of nosocomial SARS, where no aerosolizations are 
expected; surgical and N95 masks were both effective in 
significantly reducing the risk of infection. 
- Internal validity is assessed as fair; while the 4 variables were 
simple and measured in a straight forward manner, the failure to 
account for demographic differences contributed to the potential 
for confounding. 
- External validity is assessed as good, due to the specific nature of 
the occupational group to which the study results would be 
generalized to. 
- Findings are consistent with results from other studies; the 
protective role of the mask suggests that in hospital settings, 
infection is trausmitted by droplets. 
APPENDIX 3: PROPER DONNING AND REMOVAL OF PPE 
Sequence for Donning and Removing PPE (CDC)59 
Donning: 
The type ofPPE used will vary based on the level of precautions required; e.g., 
Standard and Contact, Droplet or Airborne Infection Isolation. 
2. Gown 
• Fully cover torso from neck to knees, arms to end of wrists, and wrap 
around the back 
• Fasten in back of neck and waist 
3. Mask or Respirator 
• Secure ties or elastic bands at middle of head and neck 
• Fit flexible band to nose bridge 
• Fit snug to face and below chin 
• Fit-check respirator 
4. Goggles or Face Shield 
• Place over face and eyes and adjust to fit 
5. Gloves 
• Extend to cover wrist of isolation gown 
Safe Work Practices: 
I. Keep hands away from face 
2. Limit surfaces touched 
3. Change gloves when tom or heavily contaminated 
4. Perform hand hygiene 
Removing: 
Except for respirator, remove PPE at doorway or in anteroom. Remove respirator 
after leaving patient room and closing door. 
I. Gloves 
• Outside of gloves is contaminated! 
• Grasp outside of glove with opposite gloved hand; peel off 
• Hold removed glove in gloved hand 
• Slide fingers ofungloved hand under remaining glove at wrist 
• Peel glove off over first glove 
• Discard gloves in waste container 
2. Goggles or Face Shield 
• Outside of goggles or face shield is contaminated! 
• To remove, handle by head band or ear pieces 
• Place in designated receptacle for reprocessing or in waste container 
3. Gown 
• Gown front and sleeves are contaminated! 
56 
• Unfasten ties 
• Pull away from neck and shoulders, touching inside of gowu only 
• Turn gowu inside out 
• Fold or roll into a bundle and discard 
4. Mask or Respirator 
• Front of mask/respirator is contaminated--DO NOT TOUCH! 
• Grasp bottom, then top ties or elastic and remove 
• Discard in waste container 
5. Perform hand hygiene immediately after removing all PPE 
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